לא תבערו אש בכל משבתיכם

Before starting the description of the construction of the Mishkan, the Torah begins this week's sedrah by briefly discussing the observance of Shabbos.  Aside from prohibiting melakhah generally, the Torah singles out one specific action which is prohibited on Shabbos – לא תבערו אש בכל מושבתיכם ביום השבת, "You shall not light a fire in any of your dwelling places on the day of the Sabbath" [Shemot 35:3].  With the exception of perhaps one other case (found in last week's parashah, but dependent upon a debate amongst the Tannaim of how to read בחריש ובקציר תשבות [Shemot, 34:21, Rosh HaShanah 9a]), every time the Torah mentions the prohibition of melakhah on Shabbos, it speaks of melakhah (or more accurately כל מלאכה) but does not mention any specific act or labor.  So the question begs itself, why hav'arah?

Not surprisingly, this did not escape Chazal's attention.  In several places in the Talmud [Shabbat 70a, Sanhedrin 35b, Kreitot 20b], we find reference to a debate between R. Natan and R. Yose.  According to R. Natan, the melakhah of hav'arah is no different than any of the other thirty nine melakhot; the purpose of singling it out is לחלק – to teach us that one who violates Shabbos by performing melakhot from multiple categories is liable for each one individually.  R. Yose, however, believes that the Torah singles out hav'arah precisely because it is not a full-fledged melakhah, possibly implying that had the Torah not mentioned it at all, it would not have been prohibited; and thus according to R. Yose, the prohibition of hav'arah on Shabbos is only a לאו, a negative commandment, and does not carry the penalties of kareit or capital punishment.

Needless to say, many of the classical Biblical commentators, even those who cite the Rabbinic debate, were not satisfied on a peshat level and propose alternatives.  In fact, not only the Rabbinic commentators; even the Karaites were interested in this verse – it is the source for their idea that one cannot have one's fire burning on Shabbos, even if it is lit before Shabbos begins.  It is for them and their interpretation that we can be grateful a) for an expansive passage in Ibn Ezra on this verse refuting and ridiculing their view and b) the fact that we are mandated to enjoy cholent or other hot foods on shabbos.

Amongst the classical commentators, Rashbam argues that the reason why the Torah singles out hav'arah is to make it clear that the leniencies of אוכל נפש, that is melakhah done for the purposes of food preparation in relative proximity to the meal, which exist on Yom Tov - do not exist on Shabbos.  Fire is essential to much of food preparation, and thus the Torah singles it out to make it absolutely clear that all melakhah, even for the purpose of אוכל נפש, may not be done on Shabbos.

Others, including Bekhor Shor and a number of the other Ba'alei HaTosafot suggest that hav'arah seems to be so insignificant of a melakhah that one would not have thought that it was prohibited – echoing at least the question, though not the actual answer of R. Yose that I cited earlier, i.e. in fact it is prohibited but not actually melakhah. However, whereas R. Yose thought it was not actually a full-fledged melakhah, Bekhor Shor and the others understand that it is, and that this is exactly what the verse is teaching us.

Seforno presents an argument somewhat similar to Bekhor Shor's approach, but focused more on the technical aspects of forbidden melakhah on Shabbos.  There is a basic principle in the laws of Shabbos that for a melakhah to be prohibited scripturally, that is on a דאורייתא level, it must be performed in a manner which can be considered a מלאכת מחשבת, a calculated, intentional, productive act.  Amongst the elements that this excludes is a melakhah done in a destructive fashion, מקלקל.  Seforno states that since hav'arah, at least in the immediate act of consumption, is inherently destructive, one might have thought that hav'arah, by definition, could not be a מלאכת מחשבת and thus could not be prohibited on Shabbos – hence the Torah has to tell us that this is exceptional.  (His approach is probably a reflection of a contentious dispute in the Talmud in Shabbat 106a as to whether according to R. Shimon, חובל and מבעיר [wounding and using/making a fire] are prohibited by the Torah even in situations where they are performed in a wholly destructive manner – as they are, in their essence, destructive.)

R. Samson Rafael Hirsch, however, presents a completely different approach.  He writes:

"The burning of fire is not, it would seem, a creative act, but rather a destructive one.  On the other hand, it is specifically the creating of a work-fire that represents the power that endows humanity with its domination of the physical world."

In explaining the difference between certain aspects of melakhah on Yom Tov versus Shabbos, he suggests that the prohibition of melakhah on Yom Tov stems from its status of מועד – a festival, which prohibits only מלאכת עבודה, one's toil, but not מלאכת אוכל נפש.  The prohibition of melakhah on Shabbos is different.  He writes:

"By contrast, the stoppage of melakhah on Shabbos is an admission that God has endowed humanity with the power of controlling the physical world, and that one should only exercise this power as a servant of God."

From the perspective of the laws of nature, Rav Hirsch is absolutely correct.  The ability to master fire has enabled humankind to extract calories from sources that it could not otherwise, and allowed us to create the tools to massively reshape our landscape.  This is a capacity possessed by no other creature in the animal kingdom.

If we were to think about the modern day equivalent of לא תבערו אש, that is a tool which expresses humankinds' mastery over the natural world, we would probably single out electricity.  Electricity is not actually fire, although some of the poskim of the 19th century thought it was – and even if they were technically wrong both from the perspective of physics and thus the perspective of halakhah, their position makes a lot of sense from a conceptual perspective.  And while many poskim since have backtracked on this issue (R. S. Z. Auerbach [Minhat Shlomo 1, towards the end of #9] begrudgingly treats it as a Rabbinic prohibition of מוליד – but only because of the rulings of earlier Aharonim, not because he thought the analogy compelling), nonetheless Rav Asher Weiss (Minhat Asher 1, #30) more recently has argued that it should be considered a מכה בפטיש; this identification of closing an electrical circuit with מכה בפטיש is not new but what is new is the basis of his argument.  The Yerushalmi [Shabbat 7:3] says:

רבי יוחנן ור"ש בן לקיש עבדין הוויי בהדא פירקא תלת שנין ופלוג. אפקון מיניה ארבעין חסר אחת תולדות על כל חדא וחדא. מן דאשכחון מיסמוך סמכון הא דלא אשכחון מסמוך עבדוניה משום מכה בפטיש.

R. Yohanan and Reish Lakish engaged in the analysis of this chapter (i.e the one enumerating the thirty-nine melakhot) for three and a half years – they found thirty-nine subcategories within each [of the thirty-nine melakhot]; those actions which were similar to one of the thirty-nine melakhot, they would place in that category, and those for which they couldn't find a conceptual similarity they placed in מכה בפטיש.

From this Yerushalmi, it appears that the Sages understood intuitively which actions were prohibited (rather than deriving them primarily from the construction of the Tabernacle) and had to find the category to which each belonged.  Rav Weiss argues that closing electrical circuits is so obviously melakhah and thus falls under מכה בפטיש.  On a technical level this approach might be challenged but in capturing the larger picture of shabbos, it seems to me, his approach is both insightful and spot on; it also dovetails nicely with Rav Hirsch's conception of the purpose of prohibited melakhah.  That is to say, that the activity which, more than anything else, allows us to shape our world is obviously a melakhah (actually, the quintessential melakhah) and thus if it doesn't fit into any of the other thirty-eight melakhot, it must be subsumed within מכה בפטיש.

And as we have moved farther and farther into the information economy, it is not just electricity, but "technology" more broadly which reflects a significant part of human creativity and the tools by which we control the world.  The lesson of Shabbos then, borrowing Rav Hirsch's formulation, is that it reminds us that our power over Creation needs to be exercised exclusively as עובדי השם.

And herein lies an even more important point – on Shabbos, we may not demonstrate mastery over Creation via melakhah at all; if so, the practical take-away must be that during the week when we can and do use the tools of mastery we must do so as an עובד השם.

And here I think is where we ought to consider where we as a society have perhaps lost our way – the purpose of every tool, including technology, is to master Creation; that is that we are the ones who wield the tools to accomplish our, hopefully moral and productive, ends.  We are supposed to control the tools; the tools are not supposed to control us – to use Isaiah's metaphor of the axe and the person wielding it – היתפאר הגרזן על החוצב בו אם יתגדל המשור על מניפו? [Is. 10:15]

We are supposed to be the masters, and technology our servants.  The reality, however, seems to be as King Solomon describes it in Kohelet [10:7]:

ראיתי עבדים על סוסים ושרים הולכים כעבדים על הארץ

Technology is supposed to be our tool to control our world, but do we consider how it may control us?  Do we control our devices, or do they control us?   Do we use the product, or are we the product?  Does the use of various technologies actually improve the quality of our lives, or is it a net loss – in lost time, frayed relationships and mental health?

Similarly, on a moral level, it is often said that technology and automation is going to put human workers out of jobs.  This is simply not true.  Technology and automation do not take anyone's jobs.  Human beings who choose to adopt those technologies put people out of jobs.  I am not arguing for or against automation - in some kinds of labor it is indisputably a good thing - but rather against our desire to acquit ourselves of the moral responsibility of making those choices.  Technology does not control us, we control (or at least should control) it; and we are morally responsible for the decisions that we make using that technology.

And thus, it is no surprise that the Torah chooses the melakhah of hav'arah as the paradigm of Shabbos – and not just because of its enabling us to fulfill our destiny of וכבשוה [Bereishit 1:28], achieving mastery over the world.  Just as fire can be the source of light and life, but also death and destruction, so too our mastery over creation and the technological tools that we use to achieve that mastery can improve the world, or can destroy it.  If we are careless or thoughtless, that technology will ultimately destroy us like fire as in Jeremiah's: פן תצא כאש חמתי ובערה ואין מכבה. [Jer. 4:4]

On the other hand, if we are thoughtful and careful, it can serve as the equivalent of a different fire, that of the מזבח: אש תמיד תוקד על המזבח לא תכבה [Vayikra 6:6], one which cause the Divine light to shine in our world.